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KATHRYN BENZ*

Saving Old McDonald's Farm after
South Dakota Farm Bureau, Inc. v.
Hazeltine: Rethinking the Role of the
State, Farming Operations, the
Dormant Commerce Clause, and
Growth Management Statutes
ABSTRACT
Farm production and organization in the United States is
changing, shifting from smaller, individualfarms to larger, more
intensive operations. This change has greatly increased
environmental degradation as well as economic and social
stratification in rural communities. In response to these
problems, several midwestern states have adopted legislation to
limit corporatefarm ownership. But these statutes generally run
afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause and have yet to adequately
address the aforementioned conditions, as the Eighth Circuit
determined in the 2003 South Dakota Farm Bureau, Inc. v.
Hazeltine case. This article argues that many of the
agriculturallyrelated environmental harms have less to do with
farm ownership than with the aggregation of agricultural
operations. By reframing the problem, this article analyzes the
Hazeltine decision and proposes a new solution: a statewide
growth management regulatory scheme modeled after Vermont's
Act 250. Midwestern states concerned with addressing the
problems associated with farm aggregation could adopt this
solution and avoid the dormant Commerce Clause problems
plaguing the current anti-corporatefarming statutes.
INTRODUCTION
For those whose only knowledge of America's heartland is what
they see of it from a plane window, the current state of midwestern
. J.D. 2006, University of New Mexico School of Law; B.A. 2002, Macalester College.
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agriculture might come as a surprise. The romantically idyllic image of a
small-to-moderately sized family farm producing a variety of our
nation's food often portrayed in movies and history books has now
largely been replaced by a much more solitary and manufactured reality:
Farm production in the United States is largely specialized and is
aggregating, 2 shifting to larger, 3 more concentrated operations. 4
There are a number of important outcomes of this agricultural
reorganization. Growth in farm size is one such observable outcome. 5
Over the years, the number of individual farms and the number of
individuals involved in farming has decreased, but the total amount of
farmland has remained relatively stable. Thus, the remaining farms have
more acreage on average6 and are likely concentrated in the hands of
fewer people. 7 Data from the U.S. Department of Agriculture Economic
Research Service (USDA ERS) show a growing trend in farm size toward
large farms, measured both by acreage class and sales class (those
farming at least 500 acres or selling at least $250,000 in farm products per
year).8 This fact is important because, as will be seen later in this article,
the trend toward aggregation of farm land and farm operations,
1.

Robert A. Hoppe & Penni Korb, Large and Small Farms: Trends and Characteristics,in

STRUCTURAL AND FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTIcs OF U.S. FARMS: 2004 FAMILY FARM REPORT 5,

21 (David E. Banker & James M. MacDonalds eds., 2005) (U.S. Dep't of Agric., Agric. Info.
Bull. No. 797), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aib797.
2. When I refer to the aggregation of farm land and farm operations, I am referring to
the aggregation of acres of land or the aggregation/accumulation of livestock on fewer
acres of land. For purposes of this article, I consider aggregation to be a form of resource
development.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture notes that the amount of farm sales may be a
better indicator of farm size. Hoppe & Korb, supranote 1, at 21. From statistics provided by
Hoppe and Korb, there appears to be a correlation between sales and the number of acres
on a farm. See id. at 7 fig. 1-3.
3. Robert A. Hoppe & David Banker, Production Shifting to Very Large Family Farms,
AMBER WAVES, June 2005, at 6, available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/AmberWaves/
June05.
4. See Hoppe & Korb, supra note 1, at 20-21. Agriculture is not very concentrated by
traditional measures, "although concentration is approaching a level for some commodities
where it may become a concern." Id.
5. The number of farms with fewer than 50 acres also increased; it is the number of
mid-sized farms that is in decline. Hoppe & Korb, supra note 1, at 7.
6. Id. at 5 fig. 1-1. Today the average farm size ranges from 1,000 to 2,200 acres for
high-sales small farms, large family farms, and very large family farms. Id. at 15.
7. U.S. farms are generally still controlled by individual families or, more frequently,
family corporations. See generally JUDITH E. SOMMER Er AL., STRUCTURAL AND FINANCIAL
CHARACrERSTICS OF U.S. FARMS, 1995: 20TH ANNUAL FAMILY FARM REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS 2 (U.S. Dep't of Agric., Agric. Info. Bull. No. 746) (1998), available at http://www.
ers.usda.gov/Publications/aib746.
8. Hoppe & Korb, supra note 1, at 20. See generally Richard Dooling, Home Economics:
PersonalAccounts; Nebraska's Nostalgia Trap, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006, § 4, at 13.
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particularly in areas such as livestock concentration, can lead to serious
degradation in environmental quality.
Despite a trend toward aggregation, a number of small farms, 9
small farming co-operatives, and independently owned farms persist
alongside their larger counterparts. Currently, small farming operations
"hold about 68 percent of all farm assets, including 60 percent of the land
owned by farms." 10 Further, economies in Iowa, Nebraska, and South
Dakota (among others) are largely dependent on revenue generated by
farming activities; these states use taxes and farm revenue, funneled back
into the state in the form of consumer spending, to finance their schools,
police and fire departments, and other social programs. However, the
move toward larger farms and the aggregation of agri-businesses has
radically altered state and local economies, increased environmental
degradation, and increased economic and social stratification in these
communities."
Fearing increasing "competition and economic threat to family
farmers and ranchers and an adverse impact on...traditional family
farms and rural communities by large corporate entry," 12 nine
midwestern states adopted legislation that limited corporate farming
activities and corporate ownership of farmland 13 in an effort to address
diminished environmental, economic, and social conditions in rural and
farming communities. These states focused on prohibiting non-family
owned corporate agri-business in order to address the aforementioned
problems. However, in passing the anti-corporate farming legislation,
the states also recognized that other factors helped create the problems,
noting that "it is the secondary effects of the corporate structure that are
9. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) defines small farms as those that have
annual sales below $250,000. Hoppe & Banker, supra note 3, at 6.
10. Hoppe & Korb, supra note 1, at 12.
11. See generally Meredith Redlin & Brad Redlin, Amendment E, Rural Communities and
the Family Farm,49 S.D. L. REV. 787 (2003-2004).
12. Jeffrey M. Banks, Student Article, The Past, Present and Future of Anti-Corporate
Farming Laws in South Dakota: Purposeful Discrimination or Permissive Protectionism?, 49 S.D.
L. REV. 804, 805 (2003-2004) (internal citations omitted).
13. See NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8; OKLA. CONST. art. XXII, § 2; S.D. CONST. art. XVIL
§§ 21-24; IOWA CODE §§ 9H.1-9H.15 (2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-5902 to 17-5904 (1995);
MINN. STAT. § 500.24 (2002); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 350.015 (West 2001); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 1006.1-01 to 10-06.1-27 (2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 47-9A-1 to 47-9A-23 (2003); Wis. STAT.
§ 182.001 (2002). Family farm corporations are typically exempt from the ownership
restrictions found in the anti-corporate farming legislation. Keith D. Haroldson, Two Issues
in CorporateAgriculture: AnticorporateFarming Statutes and ProductionContracts, 41 DRAKE L.
REv. 393, 403 (1992). In order for a family farm to be exempt from these regulations, "a
relationship [must exist] between ... shareholders,.. .[and]... at least one of the shareholders
[must] reside at the farm or be actively engaged in the farm's day-to-day labor and
management." Id.
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problematic- larger operations, absentee ownership, monopolistic
effects on local markets, and the associated social and environmental
14
degradation."
"Amendment E" was South Dakota's response to the
agricultural changes and the problems listed above. Passed in 1998, the
constitutional amendment prohibited corporations from acquiring or
otherwise obtaining an "interest, whether legal, beneficial, or otherwise,
in any real estate used for farming in this state."15 The law also
prohibited corporations from engaging in farming unless the corporation
fit within one of the exempted categories.' 6 While Amendment E and
other similar laws have faced numerous constitutional challenges, 17 these
challenges have remained largely unsuccessful until the Eighth Circuit
decided South Dakota Fann Bureau v. Hazeltine.18

In Hazeltine, the Eighth Circuit held that Amendment E violated
the dormant Commerce Clause and was unconstitutional. 19 Specifically,
the court found that the law was motivated by a discriminatory
purpose. 20 Critics of the opinion claim that the decision heralds "the loss
of one of the last protections for the family farm and rural economies
from corporate concentration" 21 and worry that many other anti14. Christy Anderson Brekken, Student Article, South Dakota Farm Bureau, Inc. v.
Hazeltine: The Eighth Circuit Abandons Federalism, Precedent, and Family Farmers, 22 LAW &
INEQ. 347, 355 (2004).
15. S.D. CONST. art. XVII, § 21.
16. Amendment E's 15 exemptions include family farm corporations and syndicates.
Id. § 22(1). A family farm corporation or syndicate is "engaged in farming or the ownership
of agricultural land, in which a majority of the partnership interests, shares, stock or other
ownership interests are held by members of a family or a trust created for the benefit of a
member of that family." Id. Familial membership is limited to those within the "fourth
degree of kinship according to civil law, or their spouses." Id. Other exemptions include
farming cooperatives where a majority of the members are "natural persons actively
engaged in the day-to-day labor and management of a farm," id. § 22(2), and non-profit
corporations. Id. § 22(3).
17. See, e.g., Asbury Hosp. v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207 (1945) (upholding North
Dakota farm regulatory law, which divested corporately owned farm land, against
Privileges and Immunities Clause, Contract Clause, due process, and equal protection
challenges); MSM Farms, Inc. v. Spire, 927 F.2d 330 (8th Cir. 1991) (upholding Nebraska
constitutional amendment restricting non-family farm corporate activities against equal
protection challenge); Omaha Nat'l Bank v. Spire, 389 N.W.2d 269 (Neb. 1986) (dismissing
an equal protection challenge to Nebraska's anti-corporate farming laws).
18. 340 F.3d 583 (8th Cir. 2003).
19. Id. at 597. Farm activities fall under the dormant Commerce Clause. Therefore,
regulating farming activities such as producing, maintaining, and adding value to farm
commodities may impact interstate commerce. See Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118-19
(1942) (Commerce Clause applied to production of wheat, even though production was
only intended for consumption on the farm).
20. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d at 594-98.
21. Brekken, supra note 14, at 347.
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corporate farming laws face a similar fate. 22 Indeed, many of these laws
in other states have language similar to Amendment E and share the
"common purpose of protecting the family farm way of life." 23
Because the problems facing farming communities and the
legislatures in these states are real and pressing, this Article proposes a
new way of thinking about agriculture, a state's natural resources, and
land-use planning in the Midwest. The Article begins by briefly laying
out a primary cause of a number of problems plaguing midwestern
communities and economies: agricultural aggregation. Contrary to the
focus of previous state legislatures, the current problems of the farming
community are not solely caused by the presence or operation of large
national corporations. Indeed, in 2001, 97 percent of farms were some
type of family farm and even the largest farms tended to be family
farms. 24 Given such statistics, and evidence that suggests that farms and
farming operations are getting larger (and perhaps more intensive in
nature), this article argues that many of the problems facing the Midwest
have less to do with farm ownership and more to do with the vertical
and horizontal aggregation of agriculture. 25 Thus, any solution must
adequately address the problem of aggregation and land use.
Part I of the Article begins by discussing some of the problems
caused by the aggregation of farm land and farm production, specifically
22. The proverbial writing may already be on the wall for midwestern anti-corporate
farms laws. In May 2004, a mere two months after deciding Hazeltine, the Eighth Circuit
heard the case of Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. Miller, 367 F.3d 1061 (8th Cir. 2004). In Miller, pork
processors challenged the Iowa statute forbidding certain pork processors from owning or
controlling pork production within the state as a violation of the dormant Commerce
Clause. Although the court was unable to determine whether the law possessed a
discriminatory purpose, it remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the
law "unconstitutionally discriminates against interstate commerce." Id. at 1066. This case
has not been petitioned to the Supreme Court.
More recently, the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska heard the case of
Jones v. Gale, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (D. Neb. 2005), in which owners of farms and ranches
challenged the constitutionality of Nebraska's Initiative 300, alleging, among other claims,
that the Amendment violated the dormant Commerce Clause. Judge Smith held that
Initiative 300 was unconstitutional because it had a discriminatory purpose. Further, the
court found that the amendment was facially discriminative against interstate commerce by
treating out-of-state economic interests less favorably than in-state economic interests. Id. at
1078-83.
23. James C. Chostner, Casenote, Buying the Farm: The Eighth Circuit Declares South
Dakota's Anti-Corporate Farming Amendment Violates the Dormant Commerce Clause, 11 Mo.
ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 184,184 (2004).
24. Hoppe & Korb, supra note 1, at 11.
25. This Article focuses on horizontal integration; however, who may own/run the
farm may become an issue, particularly in cases of vertical concentration. If a small number
of firms dominate any industry, then who or what organization makes up that industry
may make a difference for the purposes of anti-trust and market power inquiries.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 46

focusing on environmental and natural resource issues. Based on studies
that show that as farm size increases, environmental degradation also
increases, Part I advances a hypothesis that demonstrates a correlation
between increased environmental degradation and the aggregation of
agri-business. This Part further notes that if a state were to implement
the regulatory model suggested at the end of this Article, it would have
to provide empirical evidence of this correlation before the scheme can
be implemented and pass constitutional muster. This Part of the Article
concludes by noting that midwestern states may enact laws, including
land-use laws that may have incidental effects on interstate commerce, if
the laws are enacted to protect a legitimate judicially recognized interest
like protection of a state's environment.
Part II briefly explains the Midwest's previous solution to the
problems discussed in Part I, focusing on South Dakota's Amendment E.
This Part then reviews the rationale underlying the Eighth Circuit's
decision in Hazeltine to strike down Amendment E as unconstitutional.
Part III begins by examining how Vermont has maintained the state's
cultural and natural resources while addressing the issue of
development. Specifically, this Part looks at - Vermont's land
management statute, Act 250, and describes how the Act works and why
application of Act 250 has survived past dormant Commerce Clause
constitutional challenges.
Finally, Part IV proposes a land use regulatory scheme, modeled
after Vermont's Act 250, that will provide the desired protection to the
Midwest environment, rural communities, and state economies. This
Part describes how applying a statewide growth management strategy
similar to Vermont's Act 250 in the Midwest would not only promote
farm-size diversity and environmental sustainability, but would also
avoid the dormant Commerce Clause problems plaguing the current
anti-corporate farming statutes. Ultimately, this Article demonstrates
that, based on legal precedent and innovative land use strategies, a
Midwest state legislature is not powerless to "protect and conserve the
lands and the environment of the state.. .to insure that these lands and
environment are devoted to uses that are not detrimental to public
welfare and interests ....
"26
I. REFRAMING THE PROBLEM

Since World War II, the total number of farms in the United
States has declined while the remaining farms have continued to grow
26. Act of Apr. 4, 1970, No. 250, 1969 Vt. Acts & Resolves 237-38 (codified at VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 1 (1997) (repealed 1991)) (stated purpose behind enactment of Act 250).
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larger in size, encompassing more acreage. 27 Data from the USDA ERS
show a growing trend in farm size toward large farms, measured both
by acreage class and sales class (those farming at least 500 acres or selling
at least $250,000 in farm products a year). 28 So who owns these large
farms? While the "control of farm production by large-scale corporate
farms has long concerned social scientists," 29 the largest farms in terms of
sales tend to be family farms, and these large family farms operate more
acreage (on average) than non-family farms. 30 In fact, while "[1]arge and
very large family farms make up only 7 percent of total U.S. farms, they
produce more than half (58 percent) of agricultural production." 31 As of
2001, 97 percent of farms in the United States were family farms;
conversely, the share of farms and sales accounted for by non-family
corporations is small (approximately 14 percent) and has been relatively
stable since 1978.32

If corporate entry into agriculture is not the root cause of the
waning number of mid-size farms and declining environmental,
economic, and social conditions in the midwestern states, the debate
surrounding the current agricultural situation in this region needs to be
re-framed. As noted above, it does not appear as though the real
problem is being addressed, and the above statistics from the USDA ERS
seem to support the hypothesis that something else-for example,
aggregation-is the true culprit. Non-family corporate ownership may
play a role in the problem, but the current anti-farming legislation has
been too shortsighted, focusing on a political foe that does not seem to be
the only suspect. Until politicians, state agencies, and citizens are willing
to re-examine the situation, taking into account statistics and conducting
further studies to determine the real cause of the problems, any future
solutions will be considered politically and culturally reactive by the
courts and will continue to be struck down as unconstitutional.

27.
28.

Hoppe & Korb, supra note 1, at 5.
Id. at 20.

29.

LINDA M. LOBAO, LOCALITY AND INEQUALITY: FARM AND INDUSTRY STRUCTURE AND

SocioECONoMIC CONDmONS 2 (1990).
30. Hoppe & Korb, supra note 1, at 11, 16 & fig. 1-2.
31. Id. at 12. See also id. at 20 ("The share of production accounted for by farms with
sales of at least $250,000.. .grew from 51 percent in 1982 to 72 percent [in] 1997."). Large
family farms and very large family farms are categorized as farms with sales between
$250,000 and $499,999 and farms with sales of $500,000 or more, respectively. U.S. Dep't of
Agric., Econ. Research Serv., Briefing Rooms: Farm Structure: Glossary,http://www.ers.usda.
gov/Briefing/FarmStructure/glossary.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2006).
32. Hoppe & Korb, supra note 1, at 11-12 & figs. 1-6, 1-7.
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Consequences of Agricultural Aggregation
For a number of midwestern states, the proverbial chickens have
come home to roost: the evolution of agriculture toward larger, more
industrial farming operations has, in part, "depopulated the countryside,
destroyed the economic and social texture of small towns, and made
certain that ordinary [citizens] are defenseless against the pollution of
factory farming." 33 Indeed, a number of social scientists have studied the
connection between the viability, health, and sustainability of rural
communities and the structure of agriculture. In the 1940s,
anthropologist Walter Goldschmidt found that "communities
surrounded by large-scale farms faired poorly, on a number of important
social indicators, when compared to communities surrounded by smallto-moderate farms." 34 Further, Dean MacCannell found that, "[a]s farm
size and absentee ownership increase, social conditions in the local
community deteriorate." 35 Included in this deterioration, arguably, is the
deterioration of the region's environmental and natural resources.
Although the environmental consequences of agricultural aggregation
have rarely been considered in these types of studies on rural welfare,
there is emerging concern about this predicament, 36 and it should be
considered by Midwest legislatures when addressing the problems
37
associated with aggregation.
33. Verlyn Klinkenborg, Keeping Iowa's Young Folks at Home After They've Seen
Minnesota, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2005, at A22.
34. Rick Welsh & Thomas A. Lyson, Anti-Corporate Farming Laws, the "Goldschmidt
Hypothesis" and Rural Community Welfare 2 (Aug. 2001) (based on a paper presented at
the annual meeting of the Rural Sociological Society), available at http://www.i300.org/
anti-corp-farming.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2006). It is not clear whether the authors are
talking about large scale farms in terms of acres or, keeping in line with the USDA
definition of large farms, in terms of sales. It would appear from the context of the article,
however, that they are referring to operations with more acreage.
35. Dean MacCannell, Agribusiness and the Small Community (background paper to
Technology, Public Policy and the Changing Structure of American Agriculture, Office of
Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress) (1983), cited in U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., NAT'L
COMM'N ON SMALL FARMS, A TIME TO ACr: A REPORT OF THE USDA NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON SMALL FARMS 12 (1998) [hereinafter NAT'L COMM'N ON SMALL FARMS], available at
http://www.csrees.usda.gov/nea/ag-systems/pdfs/ time to-act_1998.pdf.
36. See, e.g., Hoppe & Korb, supra note 1, at 21 (warning that "[t]he effects of
[agricultural] concentration on the environment may actually be more of a concern than
effects on market power"). See also NAT'L COMM'N ON SMALL FARMS, supra note 35, at 9
(noting the "tendency of the large agricultural integrators to.. .pass both the risks and costs
on.. .to society at large in the form of water and soil pollution").
37. This is not a well-studied area. Indeed, if a state were to implement the regulatory
model suggested in this article, it would have to provide specific empirical evidence of the
correlation between aggregation of farm land and farm operations and harm to natural
resources before the scheme can be implemented and pass constitutional muster. One way
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All farming operations, big or small, have some negative
environmental impact on the land. Nauseating odors caused by livestock
operations can be smelled for miles. Pesticides may run off into surface
water, causing contamination of larger water systems downstream.
Exposure to the elements may erode precious top soil and contribute to
sedimentation of lakes and rivers. Further, agricultural practices
constitute the largest use of water resources. 38 Therefore, it is clear that
no farm is entirely environmentally friendly, and both large and small
farms must engage in efforts to preserve the state's environmental
resources.
However, the conventional wisdom is that small farms do not
39
produce the same harms to the environment that large farms produce.
This belief stresses that ties to the community -who wants to admit to
their neighbors that it was their hog lot that caused the contamination of
the local well water?-and greater environmental awareness through
familiarity with the community's land have generally meant that small
farm operators have acted as better stewards of the land than larger farm
40
operators.
This wisdom may be supported by the findings of a study
performed by K. Hadri and J. Whittaker. 41 In that study, Hadri and
Whittaker found that, while small farms may not be more
environmentally benign, there is a slight correlation between increased
to provide empirical evidence of this connection could be to expand on the studies
mentioned above to focus on environmental and natural resource issues and declining
rural welfare.
38. For further discussion of farms and environmental impact, see J.B. Ruhl, Farms,
Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 EcOLoGY L.Q. 263 (2000).
39. See, e.g., Dean Smith, Comment, Soil Depletion in the United States: The Relationship
Between the Loss of the American Farmer'sIndependence and the Depletion of the Soil, 22 ENVTL.
L. 1539, 1563 (1992) ("The accelerated loss of soil relates to the increased size of farms....").
See also NAT'L COMM'N ON SMALL FARMS, supra note 35, at 8 ("Small farms contribute more
than farm production to our society... .Since the majority of farmland is managed by a large
number of small farm operators, the responsible management of soil, water, and wildlife
encompassed by these farms produces significant environmental benefits."). However, not
every one shares this sentiment. But see Jim Chen, Get Green or Get Out: Decoupling
Environmentalfrom Economic Objectives in Agricultural Regulation, 48 OKLA. L. REV. 333, 337
(1995) (stating that "smallness and family ownership bear a negative correlation to
environmental protection"); Ruhl, supra note 38, at 332-33 & n.397 (questioning whether a
"small is better" mentality proves true with regard to environmental protection).
40. Chen, supra note 39, at 336 (Chen disputes this belief but notes that, "[a]ccording to
agrocological dogma, not every farmer is an equally capable steward, and not every farm
deserves the same measures of environmental trust. Small farms are better and small
family farms are best.").
41. See generally K. Hadri & J. Whittaker, Efficiency, Environmental Contaminants and
Farm Size: Testing for Links Using Stochastic Production Frontiers, 2 J. APPLIED ECON. 337
(1999).
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farm size and greater use of environmental contaminants. 42 Given this
finding, it would make sense that aggregation of agriculture, resulting in
larger, more resource-intensive farms, has the potential to cause more or
greater levels of environmental damage in a community than nonaggregation.
Simply taking a closer look at some of the current environmental
problems caused by larger farm operations may support the correlation
found by Hadri and Whittaker:
The rise of corporate farm operations has led to more
industrialization in farming-where one type of operation
is done on a mass scale.. .in livestock production, greater
concentrations of animals are confined in smaller areas
resulting in serious odor problems and ground and surface
water contamination from large manure lagoons. 43
Furthermore, remember that it is large and very large farms that produce
over half of all agricultural products, including livestock.44 Thus, it
would appear that the ability of a farm to purchase and raise more
animals creates a difference in the amount of waste created and the
potential for sustainable management. 45 As Linda Lobao noted in her
book, Locality and Inequality: Farm and Industry Structure and Socioeconomic

Conditions, "There is evidence that large industrialized farms are
associated with certain environmental damages because they have more
resources that enable them to engage in excessive detrimental
practices." 46 Therefore, it is possible to argue that farm size does matter
when looking at the amount and type of environmental damage.
States' Right to Protect Their Environment via a Regulatory Scheme
The contamination of water, air, and soil caused by the
aggregation into larger-scale farming operations impacts all state
citizens -whether they are directly involved in farming or not.
42. Id. at 353.
43. Brekken, supra note 14, at 351-52.
44. Hoppe & Korb, supra note 1, at 12-15 & figs. 1-7, 1-11. "The share of production
accounted for by farms with sales of at least $250,000.. .grew from 51 percent [in] 1982 to 72
percent [in] 1997." Id. at 20.
45. Simply stated, raising 1,000 head of cattle on ten acres does not create the same
level of environmental detriment that raising 100,000 cattle on the same amount of acreage
does. See Hoppe & Korb, supranote 1, at 21 ("The concentration of livestock production on
fewer farms and less land can lead to environmental problems if farms raising livestock do
not have enough land to absorb the manure produced.").
46. LOBAO, supranote 29, at 221.
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Recognizing the "tendency of the large agricultural integrators to.. .pass
both the risk and costs on.. .to society at large in the form of water and
soil pollution," 47 as well as the fact that the "structure of corporateowned farms leads them to be poor neighbors to rural communities, and
poor stewards of the land," 48 in passing anti-corporate farming statutes,
it would appear as though midwestern legislatures were expressing an
interest in using regulatory schemes to remedy environmental and
health problems caused by an unfettered development of these
resources.
The Supreme Court has recognized that a state has "'every right'
to protect 'its residents'...'environment,' ' 49 and that a state's interest in
preserving natural resources like water is "well within its police
power."5° Another example where a court has upheld a regulation
preserving a state's natural resource against a dormant Commerce
5
Clause challenge occurred in New York State Trawlers Ass'n v. Jorling. 1
New York amended its Environmental Conservation Law to prohibit
47. NAT'L COMM'N ON SMALL FARMS, supranote 35, at 9.
48. Brekken, supra note 14, at 354.
49. Andrew D. Thompson, Note, Public Health, Environmental Protection, and the
Dormant Commerce Clause:Maintaining State Sovereignty in the Federalist Structure, 55 CASE
W. RES.L. REv. 213, 227-28 (2004) (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617,
626 (1978)).
50. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 946 (1982). The Court held, however, that
Nebraska's reciprocity requirement that other states share water resources in order to
receive water from Nebraska operated as "an explicit barrier to commerce between...
States." Id. at 957.
51. 16 F.3d 1303 (2d Cir. 1994). See also Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 140 (1986)
(upholding a facially discriminatory Maine statute prohibiting the importation of out-ofstate baitfish); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960)
(upholding city's smoke abatement ordinance on steam vessels operating in interstate
commerce); United States v. McDougall, 25 F. Supp. 2d 85 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (upholding ban
on the transportation of American eels). It is important to note that not all regulations
dealing with natural resource protection have been upheld against dormant Commerce
Clause challenges. The Supreme Court has "consistently recognized that resource
protection is not a sufficiently legitimate state concern that would justify overt interference
with interstate commerce," Thompson, supra note 49, at 225, where such protectionism
constitutes hoarding of a state's resource and where "protectionist effects...lie in the means
as well as the ends." Id. at 228. See also Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce
Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2003) (arguing that "the modern Court has been
consistently hostile to environmental regulation" and, as a result, "both federal and state
efforts to protect the natural environment have been rendered constitutionally suspect").
However, the instant case is not illustrative of a state impermissibly hording its
natural resources. The argument here is more about regulation of resource development
than protectionist resource conservation at the expense of out-of-state commercial actors.
Moreover, as will be shown in Part IV of this article, unlike the cases where the Supreme
Court has struck down the state regulation as unconstitutional, the proposed growth
management solution is not protectionist in either its means or its ends.
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anyone who owned or operated a vessel equipped with trawling nets
from taking, landing, or possessing lobsters in Long Island Sound. The
Trawlers Association sued, alleging, among other claims, that New
York's law violated the dormant Commerce Clause. The Second Circuit
noted that, although the law differentiated "between New York residents
and non-residents for the purpose of issuing lobster permits, its
prohibition of the possession or taking of lobsters by trawlers applie[d]
equally to resident and non-resident trawlers." 52 Further, important to
the court's decision was the fact that the law was trying to prevent the
death and subsequent waste of a unique New York natural resource, the
lobster. Holding that the law did not impermissibly burden interstate
commerce, the court stated that "protection of the environment and
conservation of natural resources -including marine resources-are
53
areas of 'legitimate local concern."'
These case findings reflect the courts' understanding that when
business activities have a negative impact on a state's unique natural
resources-the Midwest's unique resources are its land and soil-the
state is able to express its legislative concern by enacting laws that
protect the health and welfare of its citizens, even if that regulation
incidentally affects interstate commerce. Thus, in the Midwest's case,
doubt as to the legitimacy of the states' interest in regulating the use of
their natural resources when they passed the anti-corporate farming
statutes is diminished; however, Midwest legislatures may not have
found a constitutional method by which to adequately address the
problems associated with farm aggregation. 54
II. THE EVOLUTION OF SOUTH DAKOTA'S ANTI-CORPORATE
FARMING LEGISLATION
In passing the now-contested anti-corporate farming legislation,
it appears as though midwestern legislatures were attempting to rectify a
problem decades in the making: the situation stemming from "the...
wholehearted, uncritical embrace of industrial agriculture."5 5 South
Dakota's anti-corporate statute, Amendment E, grew out of the same
52. Jorling, 16 F.3d at 1307.
53. Id. at 1308 (quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471
(1981)).
54. See, for example, the Eighth Circuit's comment in Hazeltine where it recognized
that "promoting family farms is a legitimate state interest," and "environmental protection
is equally legitimate." Hazeltine, 340 F.3d at 597.
55. See Klinkenborg, supra note 33 (editorial discussing how the Iowa state legislature
is attempting to spur economic development and prevent a "brain drain" following the
"social erosion" caused by the state's boom in industrial agriculture).
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situational history: agricultural trends throughout the country, including
in South Dakota, showed an increase in the size of farms but a decrease
in overall farm population. Although legislative reports concluded that
"the presence of farm corporations in South Dakota [did] not appear to
be a major cause of rural decline,"5 6 there was concern that the
agricultural trends, and subsequently diminishing economic, social, and
education standards in rural areas, were being caused by "large
57
corporate entry and 'expansion of nonfarm investment in agriculture."'
58
Amid the "fears of increased competition" and fear of "a decline in
family farm ownership," 59 the South Dakota legislature passed the
Family Farm Act of 1974.60
As the precursor to Amendment E, "the Family Farm Act was
aimed... at restricting new corporate expansion and curtailing the growth
of existing farm corporations." 61 For a time, the Family Farm Act seemed
to address the interests of local agri-businesses and the needs of the
South Dakota economy. However, in 1988, the state became the target for
expansion in hog production facilities. 62 The impetus for this targeting
was the attorney general's interpretation of the Family Farm Act's scope:
"[C]ontrary to the intent of the Act, the Attorney General narrowly
construed the language of the [Family Farm Act, opening] the door for
major feeding operations [to relocate/expand operations] in the
state....-63 Upset by the results of the Attorney General's opinion, anticorporate legislation proponents sought to further restrict corporate
presence in the state;64 Amendment E, a constitutional amendment, was
presented as the vehicle by which to accomplish this goal.
Proponents of Amendment E argued that its passage was
necessary to "prevent corporate manipulation of livestock markets,
protect the environment, and safeguard the social and economic wellbeing of rural communities." 65 Those against the measure argued that it

56. Banks, supra note 12, at 806 (quoting Curtis S. Jensen, Comment, The South Dakota
Family Farm Act of 1974: Salvation or Frustrationfor the Family Farmer? 20 S.D. L. REV. 575
(1975)).
57. Id. at 805 (quoting John C. Pietila, Note, "[le'reDoing This to Ourselves": South
Dakota's AntiCorporateFarmingAmendment, 27 J. CORP. L. 149, 153 (2001)).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Family Farm Act of 1974, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 47-9A-1 to 47-9A-23 (2003). See
also Pietila, supra note 57, at 153.
61. Banks, supra note 12, at 806.
62. Id.
63. Brekken, supra note 14, at 356.
64. Banks, supra note 12, at 807.
65. Pietila, supranote 57, at 156.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 46

would "fail to achieve its proposed objectives." 66 Put to a vote,
Amendment E garnered approval from nearly 60 percent of voters and
was adopted in 1998.67 The constitutional amendment prohibited
corporations from acquiring or otherwise obtaining an "interest, whether
legal, beneficial, or otherwise, in any real estate used for farming in this
state" 6 but specifically exempted family farm corporations and
69
syndicates, regardless of size.
Though the scope of Amendment E's regulatory scheme did not
appear to be supported by empirical evidence, 70 and although other anticorporate farming statutes had been subject to constitutional
challenges, 71 Amendment E continued to be good law until the Hazeltine
decision.
Dormant Commerce Clause
The dormant Commerce Clause provides that states may not
enact laws that discriminate against or unduly burden interstate
commerce. 72 "Although it is often categorized as a confusing and
impracticable judicial creation," 73 courts employ the dormant Commerce
Clause in order to fulfill the "Framers' purpose to 'preven[t] a State from
retreating into economic isolation or jeopardizing the welfare of the
Nation as a whole, as it would do if it were free to place burdens on the
flow of commerce across its borders that commerce wholly within those
borders would not bear.' ' 74
A state law or regulation challenged on dormant Commerce
Clause grounds is subject to a two-tiered test. The first question in a
dormant Commerce Clause analysis is whether the state's action
discriminates against interstate commerce. A law may be facially
66. Banks, supra note 12, at 807. Opponents also argued that the amendment would
"harm access to capital and financing for family farmers and cooperatives." Id.
67. Pietila, supranote 57, at 157.
68. S.D. CONST. art. XVII, § 21.
69. Id. § 22(1).
70. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. See also supraPart I.
71. See generally Asbury Hosp. v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207 (1945) (upholding North
Dakota farm regulatory law that divested corporately owned farm land, against Privileges
and Immunities Clause, Contract Clause, due process, and equal protection challenges);
MSM Farms, Inc. v. Spire, 927 F.2d 330 (8th Cir. 1991) (upholding Nebraska constitutional
amendment restricting non-family farm corporate activities against equal protection
challenge); Omaha Nat'l Bank v. Spire, 389 N.W.2d 269 (Neb. 1986) (dismissing an equal
protection challenge to Nebraska's anti-corporate farming laws).
72. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298,312 (1992).
73. Banks, supra note 12, at 813.
74. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 330-31 (1996) (quoting Okla. Tax Comm'n
v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175,180 (1995)).
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discriminatory or discriminatory in its purpose or effect.75
Discrimination refers specifically to "differential treatment of in-state
and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens
the latter." 76 If the law is facially discriminatory, it is per se invalid unless
the state can advance a compelling and legitimate non-economic interest
and show that it has no other means to advance that interest. 77 The
state's burden under this prong is "a heavy one that proponents rarely
overcome." 78
If the law is facially neutral -that is, it regulates even-handedly
against both in-state and out-of-state groups -the test's second tier, the
so-called Pike balancing test, states that the law will be struck down only
if the "burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation
to the putative local benefits." 79 Under the Pike balancing test the courts
look to see whether the statute regulates even-handedly, effectuates a
legitimate local public interest, and whether the effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental.80 Courts have greater judicial deference in
analyzing statutes under this tier.
Hazeltine's Facts and Procedural History
After Amendment E was added to the South Dakota
Constitution in 1998, 13 plaintiffs brought suit alleging that the
amendment violated the dormant Commerce Clause. 81 Among the
parties challenging the legality of Amendment E were two South Dakota
corporations, an unincorporated livestock-feeding business in South
Dakota, an Arizona cattle ranch corporation that did business in the
state, and the South Dakota Farm Bureau. The plaintiffs sought a
declaratory judgment that Amendment E was unconstitutional and an
injunction prohibiting state officials from enforcing the Amendment. 82
The district court agreed with the plaintiffs' argument and
concluded that Amendment E was unconstitutional.8 3 In applying a
dormant Commerce Clause analysis to the facts of the case, the district
75. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994); Maine v.
Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986).
76. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994).
77. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138.
78. Banks, supranote 12, at 814 (citing Taylor, 477 U.S. at 151-52) (citation omitted).
79. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137,142 (1970).
80. Id.
81. A small subset of the plaintiffs also alleged that Amendment E violated the
Americans with Disabilities Act. S.D. Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d 583, 587 (8th
Cir. 2003). Consideration of those claims is beyond the scope of this Article.
82. S.D. Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, 202 F. Supp. 2d 1020 (D.S.D. 2002).
83. Id.
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court found that the Amendment was facially discriminatory against
out-of-state corporations, and that the law's burdens on interstate
commerce were excessive compared to the local benefits of protecting
the environment and family farms. 84 The South Dakota secretary of state
and the state attorney general appealed the decision to the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals.
The Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo but ultimately
agreed with the district court's determination that Amendment E
violated the dormant Commerce Clause.85 The Eighth Circuit noted that
there was direct evidence that the drafters of Amendment E intended to
discriminate against out-of-state businesses. The court specifically noted
that "[tihe record contains a substantial amount of such evidence.. .the
most compelling of which is the 'pro' statement on a 'pro-con' statement
compiled by Secretary of State Hazeltine and disseminated to South
Dakota voters prior to the referendum." 86 The statement told voters that
"'Amendment E gives South Dakota the opportunity to decide whether
control of our state's agriculture should remain in the hands of family
farmers... or fall into the grasp of a few large corporations.' ' 87 The court
found that the "pro" statement was brimming with "protectionist
88
rhetoric."
The court rejected the State's argument that the record contained
sufficient and accurate information to support Amendment E's goals.
Although the court accepted the State's argument that "promoting
family farms is a legitimate state interest" and "environmental protection
is equally legitimate," 89 it noted that, because the "evidence in the record
demonstrates that the drafters made little effort to measure the probable
effects of Amendment E and of less drastic alternatives," it was unlikely
that "Amendment E would actually be an effective remedy for the
problems it was purportedly designed to address." 90 Thus, the court
found that the amendment was exactly the type of law the dormant
Commerce Clause was designed to protect against.
Given the court's finding that Amendment E was motivated by a
discriminatory purpose, the State was forced to demonstrate that it had
no other method by which to advance its legitimate local interests. The
Eighth Circuit noted that the focus of this part of the test is of the

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 1050.
Hazeltine, 340 F.3d at 592.
Id. at 593-94.
Id. (quoting Constitutional Amendment E: Attorney General Explanation).
Id. at 594 (quoting SDDS, Inc. v. South Dakota, 47 F.3d 263, 268 (8th Cir. 1995)).
Id. at 597.
Id. at 595.

Summer 2006]

SAVING OLD MCDONALD'S FARM

"strictest scrutiny." 91 Thus, the court's focus was not on the strength of
the interests advanced by the challenged law, but whether "reasonable
non-discriminatory alternatives exist to advance the interests." 92 Here
the court found that the State failed to meet its burden because it could
not present evidence that it had tried to advance its interests through
other non-discriminatory alternatives. 93 Ultimately the court concluded
that Amendment E violated the dormant Commerce Clause. 94
III. VERMONT'S SOLUTION: INNOVATIVE MEANS TO ADDRESS
EMERGING LAND USE HARMS
One remedy to the harms stemming from aggregation is to
control the problem through land use planning, specifically growth
management statutes. The success of any growth management statute
relies on a state-wide vision of the type of culture and economy that the
state legislature wants to promote, as well as a comprehensive
management plan for the unified use of the state's resources. Growth
management statutes are intended to "delay or prevent unwanted
changes in the character of the community,"95 and one model successful
in achieving this goal is Vermont's Act 250.
As this Part will show, Act 250 is a regulatory scheme based on a
comprehensive holistic view of how Vermont hopes to shape its overall
rate of development and land use. This goal is accomplished in a manner
consistent with the requirements of the dormant Commerce Clause.
Introduction to Vermont's Act 250
In 2004, the entire state of Vermont, a small rural state with
600,000 inhabitants, was placed on the National Trust for Historic
Preservation's list of the eleven most endangered historic places. 96 The
catalyst for this listing was Wal-Mart's proposal to locate seven new
91. Id. at 597.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 597 n.9 (noting that, because its decision was based "upon the first tier of a
dormant Commerce Clause analysis," the court "need not discuss the Pike balancing test").
95. Justin Shoemake, Note, The Smalling of America?: Growth Management Statutes and
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 48 DUKE L.J. 891, 897 (1999).
96. Nat'l Trust for Historic Preservation, America's 11 Most Endangered Historic Places
Announced, NE. PRESERVATION NEWS, June 2004, at 1, available at www.nationaltrust.org/
northeast/newsletters/nero-0604.pdf; Nat'l Trust for Historic Preservation, 11 Most
Endangered
Places:
State
of Vermont, http://www.nationaltrust.org/11most/
list.asp?i=163 (last visited Sept. 7, 2006) [hereinafter Nat'l Trust for Historic Preservation:
Vermont].
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mega-stores in various sites throughout Vermont. 97 But Vermont's
campaign to maintain its cultural identity and preserve its famous
natural resources by regulating economic growth began before the
National Trust's listing.
Vermont's economy has long been supported by farming and
logging and the tourists who come to the state to enjoy its "beautiful
natural environment." 98 However, an increase in tourism over the last 50
years has led to pressure for the importation and development of
national retail chains. 99 By exercising local planning and zoning powers,
rural towns in southern Vermont were the first to address concerns over
the sustainability of development in the state.1° ° However, given a
municipal government's limited jurisdiction, environmentalists raised
concerns that not enough was being done to curb sprawl and protect the
regional natural resources from the unfettered development that spilled
across jurisdictional boundaries. 1°1 Responding to public demand for a
different system of land use control and more government involvement,

97. This is not to say that, at the time of the National Trust's listing, there were no WalMarts located in Vermont. According to the National Trust for Historic Preservation,
"During the 1990s Wal-Mart located three of its four Vermont stores in existing buildings
and kept them relatively modest in size." Id. The relatively small size of the stores, their
location, and the fact that the pervasiveness of the stores was kept to a minimum allowed
small retailers in Vermont communities to adequately compete with the big-box giant. See
generally Dwight H. Merriam, Nonplussed About Nonpareil: Wal-Mart as a Land Use
Phenomenon, ZONING & PLAN. L. REP., Dec. 2004, at 1. In contrast, if Wal-Mart were allowed
to build mega stores, the demands for retail floor space and sufficient parking would
require stores to be located outside of the village's traditional area and would "shift[] retail
activity outside of established commercial areas." Patricia E. Salkin, Supersizing Small Town
America: Using Regionalism to Right-Size Big Box Retail, 6 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 55, 65 (2004-2005)
(internal quotes omitted). Drawing tourists away from the retail area would likely result in
a "degradation of [Vermont's] unique sense of place, economic disinvestment in historic
downtowns, loss of locally-owned businesses, and an erosion of the sense of community
that seems an inevitable by-product of big box sprawl." Nat'l Trust for Historic
Preservation: Vermont, supra note 96.
98. See Sherry Keymer Dreisewerd, Recent Development, Staving Off the Pillage of the
Village: Does In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Offer Hope to Small Merchants Strugglingfor Economic
Survival Against Box Retailers?, 54 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMp. L. 323, 327 (1998) (citing
RICHARD OLIVER BROOKS ET AL., 2 TOWARD COMMUNITY SUsTAINABILITY: VERMONT'S ACT
250, ch. 2, at 1, 6 (1997) [hereinafter BROOKS ET AL., COMMUNITY SUSTAINABILITY]).

99. See Jessica E. Jay, Note, The "Malling" of Vermont: Can the "Growth Center"
Designation Save the TraditionalVillage from Suburban Sprawl?, 21 VT. L. REV. 929, 937 (1997).
100. Dreisewerd, supra note 98, at 328.
101. See id. (discussing a growing national concern that local governments cannot
adequately address trans-jurisdictional environmental problems, including those problems
found in Vermont).
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the Vermont legislature passed the Vermont State Land Use and
Development Act of 1970 (Act 250).102
The Mechanics of Act 250
Vermont's growth management plan "has sought the sustainable
development ideal in its recognition of carrying capacity, its
commitment to conservation of farm, forest lands, energy and wildlife
resources,... its limits placed upon extinction of non-renewable natural
resources and its permitting of a community's development conditional
upon protecting natural resources." 103 Indeed, Act 250's stated purpose is
to "protect and conserve the lands and the environment of the state and
to insure that these lands and environment are devoted to uses which are
not detrimental to the public welfare and interests." 104 The Act, a growth
control statute, achieves this goal by "plac[ing] explicit limits on the
overall rate of development within a locality." 105 Specifically, Act 250
develops a comprehensive, state-administered growth management
program that requires case-by-case project review. 0 6 Even though the
program requires the state to "directly review.. .most large development
projects, permit[ting] only those that comply with set criteria," 10 7 "Act
250 [does] not supplant local control of land use decisions. Rather, it
ensure[s] a system of concurrent control, both at the state and municipal
levels, by providing an overlay on local planning and zoning."O8
102. Act of Apr. 4, 1970, No. 250, 1969 Vt. Acts & Resolves 237-50 (codified as amended
at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6001-6108 (1997 & LexisNexis Supp. 2005)).
103. BRooKs Er AL., COMMUNITY SUSTAINABILITY, supranote 98, ch. 1, at 3.
104. Act of Apr. 4, 1970, No. 250, 1969 Vt. Acts & Resolves 237-38 (codified at VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 1 (1997) (repealed 1991)).
105. Shoemake, supra note 95, at 897. As Shoemake notes, growth control ordinances or
statutes are enacted with at least one of two purposes in mind: (1) "to ensure that
development within a jurisdiction does not proceed so quickly that the local government is
unable to meet the increased demands on it for public services," id. at 897, or (2) "to delay
or prevent unwanted changes in the character of a community." Id. Although it is the
second purpose that this article focuses on, it should be noted that Vermont lacks a general
statewide development plan requiring local governments to plan in conformance with
statewide goals. This drawback means that "growth is 'managed,' if at all, in a piecemeal
fashion." Id. at 904. See also Jay, supra note 99, at 951 ("Act 250...,reformed or not, still fails
to prospectively address large-scale statewide development.").
106. George E.H. Gay, State Solutions to Growth Management: Vermont, Oregon, and a
Synthesis, 10 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 1996, at 13,14.
107. Id.
108. Dreisewerd, supra note 98, at 330. See the notes accompanying Dreisewerd's article
for a more detailed explanation of the structure and legislative history of Act 250.
However, as Dreisewerd argues, "the enactment of local and regional land use laws
is.. .authorized by the Vermont Planning and Development Act." Id. n.37 (citing VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24, §§ 4301-4494 (1997)). The Planning Act was amended in 1988 by the Vermont
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The Act requires "state review and permitting of projects of
regional significance." 10 9 The Vermont legislature appears to have tied
Act 250's review triggering mechanism, or the development's
characteristic that makes it a "project of regional significance" subject to
permitting review, to the size and location of the project. Indeed, "the
threshold level of review is very low as it affects all public and private
construction projects involving ten or more units,""1 0 "industrial or
commercial developments of over ten acres... and developments above
an elevation of 2500 feet."" 1 By requiring a case-by-case review and
focusing on the size and location of a project, rather than ownership, to
determine who must apply for a permit, the state ensures that it is not
favoring certain types of development over others and that both in-state
and out-of-state developers will be required to appear before the district
112
environmental commission.
Once it has been determined that a developer must obtain an Act
250 permit before proceeding with the project, the commission must
determine whether the project conforms with local and regional land use
plans, 113 and whether "all of the pertinent criteria have been met."" 4 Act
250 provides a list of ten conditions to assist the commission members in

Growth Management Act (Act 200) and this amendment "strengthened the state and
regional planning process." Id. n.37 (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 4341, 4345a, 4347, 4348
(1997)). As amended, the Act provides for the creation of regional planning commissions
that "prepare regional development plans that guide and encourage appropriate economic
development." Id. While municipalities are not required to participate in the regional
planning commissions, "if a local growth management plan is not approved under the
Planning Act, only the regional plan, and not the local plan, will be considered during the
Act 250 permit-review process." Id.(citing DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., PLANNING AND
CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT 867 (4th ed. 1995)).
109. Salkin, supra note 97, at 64. "Act 250 created nine district environmental
commissions throughout the state. The power to issue permits is vested in the district
commissions." Dreiseward, supra note 98, at 331-32, Before a recent amendment to the
statute, a challenge to a district commission's decision was appealed to the Vermont
Environmental Board and Board decisions were appealable to the Vermont Supreme Court.
See Shoemake, supra note 95, at 903.
110. Jay, supra note 99, at 949.
111. Shoemake, supra note 95, at 903.
112. Also important to note for purposes of a dormant Commerce Clause analysis is the
fact that Act 250's definition of "person" is extremely broad and includes any "individuals
or entities affiliated with each other for profit, consideration, or any other beneficial interest
derived from the partition or division of land." See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001(14)(A)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2005). Furthermore, this definition does not seem to draw a distinction
between out-of-state permit applicants/developers and in-state permit applicants/
developers.
113. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6086(a)(10) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005).
114. Jay, supra note 99, at 949.
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making permit determinations. 115 The act's criteria require that the
commissioners consider the environmental, social, and economic impacts
of a proposed development on the town or region where the
development will be located. For example, the district commission must
make findings that the subdivision or development will not result in
"undue water or air pollution" or "cause unreasonable soil erosion." 116
Further criteria require that the district commission consider whether the
project will have an "undue adverse effect on the scenic or natural
beauty of the area, aesthetics, historic sites[,] or rare and irreplaceable
natural areas." 117 Additional conditions were later added to specifically
address growth control concerns: "These criteria require the district
commissions and the [Vermont] Environmental Board to consider as part
of the application review process the anticipated additional costs of
education, public services, and facilities associated with a proposed
development" 118 and any "other factors relating to the public health,
safety and welfare.... "119
Act 250 includes a number of procedural safeguards for the
dissatisfied applicant whose permit is denied; decisions made by the
district commissions may be appealed to the environmental court.1 20
However, the commission's wide degree of discretion in both
interpreting and applying the criteria provides a "number of bases on
which to deny a development permit... [and] creates the possibility that
Act 250 may be used in a manner that encroaches on constitutional
121
protections like the dormant Commerce Clause."
Constitutional Challenge to Act 250: Omya, Inc. v. Vermont
Over the past ten years, denials of development permits based
on Act 250 criteria have been subject to a number of challenges. One such
relevant example occurred in 2002, when the Second Circuit heard the
case of Omya, Inc. v. Vermont.122 There, the plaintiff, a quarry operator,
challenged the constitutionality of the Vermont Environmental Board's
order limiting the number of truck trips allowed between the quarry and
the processing center. Specifically, the plaintiff in Omya appealed the
Board's refusal to grant an exemption to the restriction on the number of
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6086(a) (1-10) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005).
Id. § 6086(a)(1), (4).
Id. § 6086(a)(8).
Dreisewerd, supra note 98, at 333-34.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6086(a)(9)(A) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005).
Id. § 6089.
Shoemake, supra note 95, at 905.
Omya, Inc. v. Vermont, 33 F. App'x 581 (2d Cir. 2002).
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daily round-trips permitted by plaintiff's tractor-trailer trucks
transporting goods through Brandon, Vermont, 123 claiming that the
restriction had a disparate effect on interstate commerce and thus
violated the dormant Commerce Clause.124
The Second Circuit began its analysis by looking at whether Act
250 or the Board's permit restriction facially discriminated against
interstate commerce. The court concluded that neither was
discriminatory. 125 It noted that neither Act 250 nor the permit restriction
"imposes 'differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic
interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter."' 126 The court
found that, without evidence of discriminatory intent, "the mere fact that
plaintiff alone has been burdened by the scheme is not sufficient to
trigger heightened review." 127
Moving to the second tier of the dormant Commerce Clause
analysis, the court, without much analysis, stated that Act 250 did not
have a disparate effect on interstate commerce. 128 Further, even if Act 250
did have a disparate impact on interstate commerce, the court found that
the regulation satisfied the Pike balancing test. Because the "permit
restriction significantly enhances aesthetic and historic preservation
goals and helps reduce traffic congestion," the court concluded that "any
marginal burden imposed on interstate commerce is unquestionably not
'clearly excessive in relation' to these benefits." 129 For these reasons, the
Second Circuit concluded that Act 250 and the Environmental Board's
permit denial did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.
IV. GROWTH MANAGEMENT STATUTES IN THE MIDWEST:
UTILIZING VERMONT'S STRATEGY TO PROMOTE
SUSTAINABLE LAND USE PRACTICES
In the first part of this article, the debate on the current state of
agri-business in the Midwest was reframed and the cause of the current
problems redefined. The article ultimately noted that any state-

123. Id. at 581.
124. Id. In his appeal to the district court, the plaintiff also claimed that the regulations
violated the Supremacy, Equal Protection, and Due Process clauses. The district court
dismissed all claims. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the district court erred in
dismissing the Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause claims. Id. at 582.
125. Id. at 582-83.
126. Id. (quoting Automated Salvage Transport v. Wheelabrator, 155 F.3d 59, 74 (2d Cir.
1998)).
127. Id. at 583.
128. Id.
129. Id. (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
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sanctioned solution to the loss and destruction of natural resources, and
subsequent harm to the state's citizens and economy, must adequately
address the problem of aggregation. A state is entitled to enact
legislation that defends a legitimate state interest, like preservation of a
state's environment, but it must do so in a constitutional manner. Like
the Midwest, Vermont is dealing with environmental and economic
problems stemming from increased and unfettered development of the
state's land. However, while many midwestern states' previous
solutions-like South Dakota's Amendment E-were too politically
reactive, "brimming with protectionist rhetoric,"130 Vermont has
successfully addressed its development problem in a way that is not only
effective in protecting its natural resources, but is constitutional as well.
Part IV argues that, if states like South Dakota follow the spirit
as well as the general format of Vermont's Act 250, the regulatory
scheme is unlikely to run into problems with the dormant Commerce
Clause. While Act 250 was upheld against dormant Commerce Clause in
Omya, it is important to expand on the Second Circuit's analysis to fully
understand why a growth management statute structured like Act 250
would be upheld under myriad factual challenges. 131 Thus, Part IV of
this article subjects Act 250 to a rigorous dormant Commerce Clause
analysis, clearly explaining why Vermont officials have acted
constitutionally when they implemented, and continue to implement, the
Act's provisions. 132 By analogy, if a midwestern state were to adopt a
similar regulatory model, supported by studies and evidence that link
the state's environmental problems to aggregation, this growth
management scheme would also survive a dormant Commerce Clause
33
challenge.
130. S.D. Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d 583,594 (8th Cir. 2003).
131. This is not to say that no dormant Commerce Clause challenge would succeed.
Scholars have noted that there is a "difficulty of predicting the outcome of dormant
Commerce Clause cases generally." Shoemake, supra note 95, at 920. However, for
purposes of arguing that similar statutes should be enacted in midwestern states in order to
provide these states with a way to protect their citizens against the harms of aggregation, it
is fairly certain that such regulatory schemes would survive this type of constitutional
challenge.
132. The analysis in Part IV draws heavily on the analysis by Shoemake, supra note 95,
with the addition of new case law and insights of my own.
133. Given the physical, historical, and cultural differences between Vermont and
midwestern states, a wholesale implementation of Act 250, without modifications, would
not adequately address development problems in the Heartland. Therefore, state
legislatures must modify certain mechanics of such an act.
For example, Act 250 excludes farming operations from its permitting requirement,
but not feedlots. Obviously one of the biggest problems in the Midwest is not just
consolidated feedlots but intensive crop-producing endeavors as well. Therefore, if South
Dakota, for example, were to adopt a growth management statute, it would be in the state's
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A Growth Management Statute Modeled after Act 250 Is Not
Discriminatory in Its Purpose
If a foreign plaintiff could prove that either the Vermont
Legislature or the Environmental Board intended to discriminate against
out-of-state entities by enacting Act 250 or creating subsequent
regulations, the plaintiff would succeed in proving a dormant Commerce
Clause violation. However, finding direct evidence of facial
discrimination in this case seems unlikely for a number of reasons.134
First, Act 250's stated purpose is to "protect and conserve the lands and
the environment of the State and to ensure that these lands and
environment are devoted to uses which are not detrimental to the public
welfare and interests." 135 The statute says nothing about economic
protectionism for the benefit of local entities. 136 In fact, the Act defines
best interest not to exclude farming development/changes from its permitting
requirements. Another problem with Act 250 (a problem not discussed in-depth because it
is beyond the scope of this article) is the fact that Vermont has not developed a
comprehensive state-wide development plan. Rather, each regional reviewing board is left
to decide the permit applications on a case-by-case basis. Shoemake, supra note 95, at 904.
Obviously it would be better if a state were to have a unified vision of the direction in
which it wished to take its land and people, and it would be my hope that an implementing
legislature would consider this goal.
It should also be noted that proposing an entire model growth management statute is
beyond the scope of this article. Part IV merely makes the argument that, if the Midwest
were to adopt the framework and spirit of Vermont's land-use plan, it would withstand a
dormant Commerce Clause challenge. Thus, in discussing a theoretical challenge to a
midwestern Vermont-type land-use plan, I will rely on the general language, structure, and
legislative intent of Act 250.
134. In his article, Shoemake notes that, if, for example, a developer were to challenge
Act 250's fiscal criteria upon which the commission relied in denying a permit application,
the developer would be "challenging not Act 250 itself but the interpretation of that Act by
the Environmental Board and the Vermont Supreme Court, neither of which is likely to
offer offhand, unwise indications of its discriminatory intent (assuming for the moment
that such intent exists)." Shoemake, supra note 95, at 921. This could be the type of
challenge raised in a case involving a midwestern version of the statute, but, as Shoemake
notes, "in order to put forward a successful dormant Commerce Clause challenge to the
interpretation [the challenger] would have to demonstrate intent indirectly, by showing
that the interpretation has a discriminatory impact on out-of-state interests. This would
require... the reviewing court... to dive into the murky waters of assessing burdens." Id. at
921-22.
135. Act of Apr. 4, 1970, No. 250, 1969 Vt. Acts & Resolves 237-38 (codified at VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 1 (1997) (repealed 1991)).
136. Contrast this with the legislative history of Amendment E or other anti-corporate
farming laws. While there is some argument that the language of Amendment E was
neutral on its face, applying to any non-family farm corporation or syndicate operating a
farm or purchasing farmland in South Dakota, the legislative history tells another story. See
Roger A. McEowen & Neil E. Harl, South Dakota Amendment E Ruled Unconstitutional- Is
There a Future for Legislative Involvement in Shaping the Structure of Agriculture?, 37
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"development" as an improvement on a tract of land involving more
than ten acres for commercial or industrial purposes 137-the statute does
not distinguish between in-state and out-of-state developers.
Additionally, "the Vermont Supreme Court was careful, as the
Environmental Board had been at the earlier stage of the [In re Wal-Mart]
dispute, to emphasize that the consideration of market competition was
relevant only because of the effect that competition can have on property
values, and, hence, local tax bases." 138 States are well within their power
to enact legislation that protects their citizens' welfare and interests. 139
Note that an analysis under this prong of the dormant
Commerce Clause would require the court to focus on the specific
language and/or the legislative history of the enabling statute. But based
on the analysis above, if a midwestern statute were enacted with similar
legislative goals and language, it is unlikely that a challenge would
succeed based on the argument that there was a discriminatory intent in
enacting this type of regulatory scheme.
Application of a Growth Management Statute Modeled after Act 250 Is
Facially Neutral

In the Midwest and Vermont, arguably, the land use goals are
similar in that both are striving to preserve a "natural resource
economy." 14° As a natural resource economy - the area's economic
activities are dependant on and complementary to the region's natural
resources- the state must regulate development of their lands in order to
preserve their resources from waste and to protect against a
subsequently disastrous effect on the state's economies and the welfare
of its citizens. Further, in both regions, the problem is not how to keep
out development and aggregation, "but how to accommodate
[development] without harm to the environment." 141 Based on the
CREIGH-rON L. REv. 285, 298-99 (2004). For example, the Eighth Circuit found that the

record contained a "pro" statement in a "pro-con" statement compiled by the Secretary of
State and disseminated to South Dakota voters prior to the referendum. S.D. Farm Bureau,
Inc. v. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d 583, 594 (8th Cir. 2003).
137. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001(3)(A) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005).
138. Shoemake, supranote 95, at 921.
139. See Tex. Mfrd. Hous. Ass'n v. City of Nederland, 101 F.3d 1095, 1104 n.10 (5th Cir.
1996); MSM Farms v. Spire, 927 F.2d 330, 332-33 (8th Cir. 1991).
140. BROOKS ET AL., COMMUNITY SUSTAINABILrrY, supra note 98, ch. 2, at 20 (elaboration
on Vermont's "natural resources economy").
141. Id. ch. 5, at 32. Arguably, without preservation of these resources, preservation of
the state's economy could be at risk. For instance, if South Dakota continues to allow more
intensive and larger farming practices to operate unregulated, the rich topsoil that supports
its agrarian economy will be wasted. Similarly, if Vermont had not enacted Act 250, its
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similar land use goals of the two areas, regulation requires a solution
that takes into "account and effectively manages in a coordinated
fashion, the interconnectivity and impacts of such development on all
neighboring municipalities." 42 The triggering point or characteristic that
would alert the state that a review of the proposed development/use is
necessary thus should be similar in both Vermont and the Midwest.
Act 250's criteria, "and the expansive interpretation of them
approved by the Vermont Supreme Court, are not facially
discriminatory"; 143 in other words, the Act does not provide different
treatment for in-state interests and out-of-state interests, benefiting the
former and burdening the latter. The Vermont legislature did not
randomly pick acre sizes in order to determine what a "project of
regional significance" would be. Rather, in creating a comprehensive
state capability and development plan, the legislature relied in part on
information from the Gibb Report.""'
On May 14, 1969, then-Governor Davis appointed a Governor's
Commission on Environmental Control, which included some of the
leading environmental, business, and political leaders in Vermont and
was headed by Representative Arthur Gibb.'45 In beginning their study,
"the Commission recognized that Vermont's environment was under
siege from large developers.. .but distinguished between ordinary land
use problems of traffic, billboards, litter, 'landscape blight' [and focused
on] the deeper threats affecting the ecological balance of the
environment." 146 The detailed Gibb report expressed concern about the
"problems of large-scale residential development and recommended
reform of municipal subdivision laws," 147 but also focused on identifying
a number of other environmental problems plaguing Vermont. The
report not only recognized environmental problems, it also identified the
sources of these problems, including industrial pollution, public waste
disposal, and development. In the end, the Commission made a number
of recommendations to address the environmental issues, including
statewide zoning of higher elevations in order to "keep the ecological
disturbances at these elevations.... to an absolute minimum." 148
scenic views and forests, mainstays of the state's important tourist industry, would have
been lost to developers long ago.
142. Salkin, supra note 97, at 54.
143. Shoemake, supra note 95, at 921.
144. BROOKS ET AL., COMMUNITY SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 98, ch. 5, at 2 & n.8 (citing
Governor's Comm'n on Envtl. Control, Reports to Governor, Jan. 19,1970 & May 18,1970).
145. Id. at 2 & n.7.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 2 n.8.
148. Id.
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Vermont's Act 250 was introduced "as a result of
recommendations
made by the Governor's
Commission on
Environmental Control" 149 and was designed to "establish policies and
procedures for control of land development.. .based upon the capability
of the environment to support development."'50 Using the information
from the Gibb Report, as well as information gleaned from hearings
before the senate Natural Resources Committee, the legislature
developed guidelines for utilization of the lands by focusing on
determining which types and size of projects would "have the greatest
environmental impact and... [be] subject to less municipal level
review." 15 1 Larger projects, industrial or commercial developments over
ten acres within a five mile radius of a municipality, industrial, or
commercial development of one acre or more within a municipality
without a permanent zoning ordinance, and developments above an
elevation of 2,500 feet 152 were determined to fit this criteria and thus
became the trigger point for review. 153
There appears to be no evidence that setting the triggering
criteria discriminates against out-of-state developers or forces them to
appear before the review board more often than Vermont developers.
Nor is there evidence that setting the criteria at this level means that outof-state proposals are rejected more frequently than in-state developers.
In fact, in recognizing the importance of economic growth, the focus of
Act 250 is not on "barring development, but on molding it to minimize

149. Id. at 3.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 4 n.35. "An initial proposal called for any development, without regard to the
size of the lot. The administrative burden would have been too great so it was decided to
use the ten acre lot size." Id. (citing Hearing on H. 417 Before the S. Natural Res. Comm.,
50th Biennial Sess., Adj. Sess. 1 (Mar. 16, 1970)). It would appear that, between the Gibb
Report and the information presented to the Senate's Natural Resources Committee, the
legislature relied on a study to pinpoint the size of development not supported by the
environment's capacity. However, if such a study did not specifically address this issue,
then Vermont must also do a definitive study to determine at what point the
development's impact on the environment outweighs its benefit to the state. Jon T.
Anderson, Defining the Limits of Act 250 Jurisdiction,31 VT. B.J., Spring 2005, at 41,41.
152. Shoemake, supranote 95, at 903.
153. See generally James Murphy, Vermont's Act 250 and the Problem of Sprawl, 9 ALB. L.
ENvTL. OUTLOOK. 205, 223-27 (2004). "The most important determining factors in deciding
whether to grant a permit, according to recent Board and district commission decisions...,
are the scale of a project and how it blends with its surroundings." Id. at 223. For examples
of large projects that were denied permits and which of the criteria they violated, see id. at
223-27.
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its environmental impact." 15 4 Although denial of a permit is possible,
55
over 97 percent of permits are approved.'
A similar trigger point emphasizing the potential impact of the
improvement on a tract of land could be set in the Midwest. This Article
has shown that conventional wisdom holds that, as a farm increases in
size, its environmental impact increases. However, no definitive study
has been done to determine at what point (measured by either acreage or
sales class) the farm's impact on the environment outweighs its benefit to
the state or is inconsistent with the (hopefully forthcoming) stated landuse goals/plans. 5 6 Each agricultural state would have to undertake this
study, and, based on the state's findings, it is perhaps at that farm size
that a farm operation would need to apply for a permit before it could
plow additional acres or add to its inventory of livestock. Based on the
model presented by Act 250, any farm operation, regardless of
ownership, that fell into the category of "projects of significance" would
have to apply for the permit in order to complete future land expansions
or transactions. Requiring farm operations that fall into this category to
apply for a permit would likely capture both in-state and out-of-state
farming operations in the regulatory scheme.15 7 Thus, like the triggering
mechanism in Vermont, a similar triggering mechanism in the Midwest
would likely avoid the problem of unduly discriminating against out-ofstate businesses. Finally, any potential discrimination could be further
avoided by reviewing applications on a case-by-case basis. Individual

154.

Southview Assocs. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84,89 (2d Cir. 1993).

155.

BROOKS ET AL., COMMUNITY STABILrTY, supra note 98, ch. 9, at 2 n.24. Although these

permits may contain conditions placed upon the development, it does not appear as
though out-of-state developers have been issued conditional permits more frequently than
in-state developers. In fact, when the environmental board or commission denies an
application, it must base its decision on findings of fact and conclusions of law. Legitimate
factual reasons for denying a permit include whether the "proposed subdivision or
development [would be] detrimental to the public health, safety or general welfare." VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6087(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005).
156. Although no such study exists for environmental impacts and farm size,
determining the appropriate "trigger point" is clearly possible and has been established for
other social impacts like poverty and unemployment. One study showed that diversity in
agriculture structure, including farm size, may reduce poverty and unemployment in
agriculturally dependent rural communities. However, beyond a certain size (or if there are
too many large farms and not enough small farms), the benefit to the community ceases.
See Welsh & Lyson, supra note 34, at 11.
157. Remember, large and very large family farms (more likely owned by in-state
residents) and non-family (corporate, non-resident) farms account for 72 percent of total
production. See generally Hoppe & Korb, supra note 1, at 20. These large industrialized
farms are more likely to be associated with certain environmental damages because "they
have more resources that enable them to engage in excessive, detrimental practices."
LOBAO, supra note 29, at 221.
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review would allow the review board to determine whether one large
farm employs more sustainable techniques, has less of an impact on the
environment, and is more in tune with the state's vision of its overall
land use plan than another large farm of equal acreage or in a similar
sales class.
If the Midwest were to base who is required to obtain a
development or use permit not on ownership type but on size and potential
impact on state resources, a reviewing court would likely find that the
intent of the permit review board was not to burden or discriminate
against out-of-state entities, but rather "to protect and conserve the lands
and the environment of the State and to ensure that these lands and
environment are devoted to uses which are not detrimental to the public
welfare and interests." 158
Application of a Growth Management Policy Modeled after Act 250
Does Not Produce Discriminatory Effects
In essence, plaintiffs, like the plaintiff in Omya, who challenge
the Vermont Environmental Board's permitting restrictions do so by
arguing that, regardless of the intent behind the Board's action, Act 250,
as a regulatory scheme, "too conveniently favors in-state, existing
businesses over out-of-state business." 159 However, claims that
characterize the Act 250 application process and its criteria as creating a
competitive advantage for in-state businesses over out-of-state
businesses are also unlikely to be persuasive. Although the Supreme
Court has held that a law providing a competitive advantage to state
residents is akin to a statute being discriminatory in effect, 160 no
158. Act of Apr. 4, 1970, No. 250, 1969 Vt. Acts & Resolves 237-38 (codified at VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 1 (1997) (repealed 1991)) (stated purpose behind enactment of Act 250).
159. Shoemake, supra note 95, at 923. This was essentially the argument that Shoemake
said Wal-Mart would have made if it had brought a dormant Commerce Clause claim in In
re Wal-Mart:
Wal-Mart would basically argue that the consideration of market
competition, in combination with the ten-acre "trigger" for Act 250,
operates effectively to prevent large retailers from building stores in
Vermont.. .the limitation on market competition benefits all those with an
existing interest in commercial developments in Vermont by ensuring that
those developments will not have to compete with newer, larger
developments if such competition would mean a decline in the fortunes of
existing developments.
Id. at 922-23.
160. In Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333 (1977), a
North Carolina law required that all closed containers of apples sold or shipped into the
state bear the statement, "no grade other than the applicable U.S. grade or standard." Id. at
339. Although the law was facially neutral-it applied to all apples sold in the state,
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advantage is present in this case. Act 250 does not distinguish between
those required to apply for a development permit; rather, the focus of the
application process is on the size and the environmental impact of the
activity, not who is perpetuating the activity. Thus, any commercial or
industrial purposes development project involving more than ten acres
of land within a five mile radius of the municipality or more than one
acre within a municipality is required to apply, regardless of whether the
developer is a local resident or is from out of state.161 If a developer could
show that "no in-state retailers are likely to require more than ten acres
on which to build a store," 162 then it may be possible for a plaintiff to
claim that "out-of-state interests are burdened [in favor] of in-state
interests (as well as out-of-state interests who do not fall within [the
Act's] ambit)." 163
Shoemake argued that an out-of-state business's best argument
is that a statute like Vermont's Act 250 "is stripping those retailers of
their competitive advantage by forcing them to do business in a different
way." 164 But after the Supreme Court's decision in Exxon Corp. v.
Governor of Maryland,165 this argument is unlikely to convince a court that
a state's growth management statute violates the dormant Commerce
Clause.166
In Exxon, oil companies brought an action to challenge the
validity of a Maryland statute restricting producers or refiners of
petroleum products from operating any retail service stations within the

whether the apples were produced in or out of state -the Supreme Court held that the
grading regulation was unconstitutional because of its effect on out-of-state apples.
Washington state's system was different from, and more stringent than, the federal (and
North Carolina) standard. Thus, in effect, the North Carolina law would "strip away from
the Washington apple industry the competitive advantages it had earned for itself through
its expensive inspection and grading system." Id. at 350-51. In fact, the Supreme Court
found evidence that the North Carolina statute had a "leveling effect which insidiously
operat[edl to the advantage of local apple producers." Id.
161. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005). In interpreting Act 250,
the Environmental Board has enacted rules that include commercial residential dwellings
within the Act's concept of "commercial or industrial purpose," thus requiring a permit
before such development can begin. Environmental Board Rules 2(L) at 2(A)(2). Courts
have also construed Act 250 and the Environmental Board's rules to cover projects
undertaken by non-profit organizations. See In re Spring Brook Farm Found., Inc., 671 A.2d
315, 319 (Vt. 1995). Since many different types of projects and developers are included
within Act 250's ambit, it makes the discriminatory effects argument much more difficult to
prove.
162. Shoemake, supranote 95, at 924.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 925.
165. 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
166. Shoemake, supra note 95, at 925.
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state. 167 The law was enacted in response to evidence that, during the
1973 petroleum shortage, gas stations operated by producers or refiners
received preferential treatment. 16 The oil companies' complaint
challenged the validity of the statute on both constitutional and federal
statutory grounds. The complaint alleged that the statute violated the
Commerce Clause "by discriminating against interstate commerce,...by
unduly burdening interstate commerce[,] and.. .by imposing controls on
a commercial activity of such an essentially interstate character that it is
169
not amenable to state regulation."
The Court rejected Exxon's argument, holding that the statute
was not discriminatory because it did not treat in-state and out-of-state
companies differently 70 The fact that the burden of the statute fell solely
on the interstate companies did not, by itself, establish a violation of the
dormant Commerce Clause. 171 The Court noted that the law did not
create barriers against interstate dealers and did not create a competitive
advantage, prohibit the flow of interstate goods, place added costs upon
dealers, or distinguish between in-state and out-of-state companies in the
retail market. 172 According to the Court's opinion, "[tihe absence of any
of these factors fully distinguishes this case from those in which the state
73
has been found to have discriminated against interstate commerce."
The Court also noted that, even if the statute caused some of the
refineries to cease selling petroleum in Maryland, this did not mean that

167. Exxon, 437 U.S. at 119-23.
168. Id. at 121. No petroleum products are produced or refined in Maryland; all of the
gasoline sold by Exxon in Maryland is transported into the state from refineries located
elsewhere. Id. at 121, 123.
169. Id. at 125.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 126.
172. Id.
173. Id. The Court contrasted the facts of the Exxon case with the facts in Hunt v.
Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333 (1977), in which the statute was
deemed unconstitutional. It has been noted that the Exxon decision is difficult to reconcile
with Hunt. Shoemake, supra note 95, at 926. However, the two may be reconciled if one
notices "that, in Hunt, the Court found the statute ineffective at serving its avowed public
purpose." Id. Thus, the two cases can be read to
suggest that the Court, when it makes its discrimination determination,
may consider more than just the discriminatory intent or effect of a
measure (even though, according to the doctrine, how well a measure
serves its purpose is not to be taken into account until after the
discrimination determination has been made).
Id. Indeed, Shoemake's interpretation is supported by the Supreme Court's claim in Exxon
Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. at 126, that, unlike the statute in Exxon, the statute in
Hunt raised the cost of doing business for out-of-state dealers and in other ways favored
the in-state dealer in the local market.
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the statute impermissibly burdened interstate commerce. 174 The Court
firmly stated that the Commerce Clause does not protect "the particular
structure or methods of operation in a retail market... [nor does the
Commerce Clause protect] particular interstate firms[] from prohibitive
or burdensome regulations." 17 For these reasons, the Court declined to
invalidate the statute under the dormant Commerce Clause. Given the
Court's unambiguous analysis in Exxon, a law modeled after Act 250 that
permissibly regulates a way of doing business rather than
unconstitutionally restricting the flow of goods will be upheld against
this type of constitutional challenge.
Additionally, the criteria used to evaluate a development permit
in Vermont do not impede or limit the flow of goods or suppress out-ofstate competition, but merely regulate the way in which business is
conducted. 76 If a statute does not treat in-state and out-of-state
companies differently, merely forcing a business to modify the way in
which it does business is not necessarily an excessive burden capable of
invalidating a growth management statute. 177 In Exxon, the potentially
extreme fact that the "burden of the statute happened to fall exclusively
on out-of-state interests did not lead... to a conclusion that the State is
discriminating against interstate commerce at the retail level." 178 Thus,
even if application of a growth management statute results in the denial
of a development permit, as it did in Omya, or the fact that one agribusiness in South Dakota, for example, may have to apply for an
aggregation permit more frequently than another before the first can
increase the number of hogs it raises or before it can purchase additional
174.

Exxon, 437 U.S. at 127.

175.

Id. at 127-28.

176. Contrast these facts with the facts of Hunt, 432 U.S. at 350-54, where the Supreme
Court found that "the [North Carolina] statute ha[d] the effect of stripping away from the
Washington Apple Industry the competitive and economic advantages it had earned for
itself through its expensive inspection and grading system." Id. at 351. See also Shoemake,
supra note 95, at 929-30 (analyzing H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949)
(holding that New York's denial of Plaintiff's license application to expand its milk
distribution to facilities within the state was unconstitutional, and the denial of the permit
served to suppress competition)).
177. Exxon, 437 U.S. at 125-27. See also supra notes 162-175 and accompanying text.
178. Shoemake, supra note 95, at 925 (internal quotation and citation omitted). The
problems in Exxon would not necessarily be an issue in the case of applying a growth
management statute in the Midwest. Here, midwestern states are interested in regulating
an operation that has a particular impact on the environment-the regulation is not
necessarily based on a type of ownership (corporate versus family farmer). Because some
of the largest, most frequently aggregating farms are owned by family farmers who operate
the business from within the state, it is not likely that the impact of the growth
management policy will be felt on out-of-state farmers more frequently than in-state
farmers.
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acreage for planting is not excessive in light of the "numerous (and not
purely financial) local benefits flowing from a careful application" 179 of
growth management criteria.
For a reviewing court to find otherwise would ignore both the
state's right to enact regulation that protects its residents' environment
and the fact that the interests protected by the dormant Commerce
Clause are "defined in terms of the market as a whole; they are not the
interests of particular firms."18° Based on the analyses in Exxon and
Omya, and without evidence that a Midwest growth management statute
creates barriers against interstate deals, creates a competitive advantage
to help in-staters at the expense of out-of-staters, prohibits the flow of
interstate goods, or distinguishes between in-state and out-of-state
companies in the retail market, it is unlikely that a reviewing court will
find that the state has used its regulatory power to impermissibly
discriminate against interstate commerce.
Even If There Is a Burden on Interstate Commerce, the Burden Is Not
"Clearly Excessive" in Light of the Local Benefits' 81
Because a growth management policy modeled after Act 250
neutrally regulates both in-state and out-of-state groups, it will be struck
down only if the "burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." 182 The Pike balancing
test is a "more nuanced, more expansive inquiry" and "explicitly allows
a court to consider the nature of the public interest being served by a
measure." 183 Under this balancing test, courts will also examine whether
the law's effects on interstate commerce are only incidental. 184

179. Id. at 930.
180. Susan E. Stokes & Christy Anderson Brekken, The Eighth Circuit Grants Corporate
Interests a New Weapon Against State Regulation in South Dakota Farm Bureau v. Hazeltine,
49 S.D. L. REV. 795, 802 (2004).
181. Quoted language taken from Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
Because the Eighth Circuit found that South Dakota's right-to-farm statute was motivated
by a discriminatory purpose, it did not reach an analysis under the Pike balancing test. S.D.
Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d 583, 593 (8th Cir. 2003). It is possible to argue that,
if South Dakota had provided enough evidence to support the claim that it had a rational
reason to enforce the discriminatory law, the Eighth Circuit may have upheld the law
under the second prong of the Pike test. However, this article does not focus on that
argument. Instead, it argues that states may achieve the aforementioned goals and avoid
future constitutional challenges by implementing a growth management policy modeled
after Act 250.
182. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
183. Shoemake, supra note 95, at 929.
184. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
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If the purpose of regulations like Act 250 and its ilk was to
preserve a local industry from collapse by protecting it from the rigors of
interstate competition, it would be fairly clear that the interest being
served by the regulation was clearly excessive in light of the burden
imposed on interstate commerce. "Courts are likely to be wary when it
appears that competition is being suppressed," 185 and this suspicion was
evidenced by the Supreme Court in its decision in West Lynn Creamery,
Inc. v. Healy.186 In West Lynn Creamery, Massachusetts milk dealers
brought suit challenging milk pricing orders as violations of the
Commerce Clause. The milk pricing order subjected all fluid milk sold
by dealers to Massachusetts retailers to make a monthly premium
payment into the Massachusetts Dairy Equalization Fund. 187 Though
most of the milk was produced out of state, the entire order was applied
to Massachusetts dairy farmers. The Court rejected the state's argument
that the orders' incidental burden on commerce was justified by the
benefit of saving an industry from collapse, noting that the "'distinction
between the power of the State to shelter its people from menaces to
their health or safety.. .and its lack of power to retard, burden or
constrict the flow of such commerce for their economic advantage, is one
deeply rooted in both our history and our law. '" 18 8 Ultimately, the
Supreme Court found that the pricing order violated the dormant
Commerce Clause, reasoning that to accept the respondent's arguments
would "make a virtue of the vice that the rule against discrimination
89
condemns."
Suppression of economic competition is not the goal of Act 250,
nor would it be the purpose of a similar policy enacted in the Midwest to
address the problems of farm aggregation. As noted above, growth
management statutes aim to "delay or prevent unwanted changes in the
character of the community" 190 by protecting a state's environment and
ensuring that the land is not used to the detriment of the public welfare
and its interests.191 With this in mind, the function of a Midwest land-use
regulatory scheme is to strike a balance between the environmental
impacts of big and small, traditional and more-industrialized farming
operations-not to promote a certain type of farming activity, hoard a
185. Shoemake, supra note 95, at 929.
186. 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
187. Id. at 190-91.
188. Id. at 206 n.21 (quoting H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533
(1949)).
189. Id. at 205.
190. Shoemake, supra note 95, at 897.
191. Act of Apr. 4, 1970, No. 250, 1969 Vt. Acts & Resolves 237-38 (codified at VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 1 (1997) (repealed 1991)).
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natural resource, or protect in-state farmers from their out-of-state
competitors.192 Unlike West Lynn Creamery, where the purpose of the
measure was purely economic protectionism to benefit private local
interests, here, the goal of the proposed regulation is not suppressing
competition, but rather environmental preservation and the resulting
health and welfare of the state's citizens.
Finally, under the Pike balancing test, examining whether a law
is effective in achieving its stated goals helps a court to determine
whether the law's burdens on commerce are "clearly excessive" in
relation to its benefits. For example, in Hazeltine, the Eighth Circuit
expressed its concern that "[w]hether Amendment E would protect
family farmers and the environment is unknown." 193 This was also a
concern for the Court in Hunt. There, the Supreme Court was concerned
that the apple labeling statute was inefficient in achieving its primary
objective-consumer protection from confusion and deception in the
marketing of foodstuffs-because it did nothing to "purify the flow of
information at the retail level." 194
In contrast, Act 250 has proven to be effective in curbing the
impact of rampant development in Vermont. 195 The law's effectiveness is
in part due to the streamlined structure and clear focus of the regulatory
scheme: in establishing a permitting scheme that contains criteria
addressing the potential problems that certain development projects
could cause, Act 250 is narrowly tailored to achieve its objectives. 196 The
Second Circuit came to this exact conclusion in Omya, finding that the
aesthetic and historic preservation criteria used in analyzing whether or
not to grant the plaintiff a permit were directly related to Act 250's
overall development objectives. 197 In fact, the Second Circuit noted that,
even if Vermont's permit restrictions imposed a burden on interstate
commerce, such a burden was not clearly excessive in relation to the

192. See supra Part I.
193. S.D. Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d 583, 595 (8th Cir. 2003).
194. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333,353 (1977).
195. See generally supra Part III
and the beginning of Part IV.
196. See generally Shoemake, supra note 95, at 926-29. Shoemake points out, for example,
that protecting the tax base has been recognized as an exercise of the police power
rationally related to promoting the public welfare. Further, protecting environmental
benefits has long been recognized as a valid state interest that may be protected by state
regulation. See Hazeltine, 340 F.3d at 597 ("the purpose of environmental protection
is.. .legitimate"); N.Y. State Trawlers Ass'n v. Jorling, 16 F.3d 1303, 1308 (2d Cir. 1994)
(upholding New York regulation and noting that "protection of the environment and
conservation of natural resources are areas of 'legitimate local concern" (quoting
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1981))).
197. Omya, Inc. v. Vermont, 33 F. App'x 581, 583 (2d Cir. 2002).
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enhancement of aesthetic and historic preservation goals and the
reduction of traffic congestion and pollution. 198
The geographical organization and the expertise of the
environmental board and the district commissions aid in the ability to
successfully achieve Act 250's goal of environmental sustainability. For
example, Vermont's environmental commissions, organized at the
regional level, are in the best position to know how development will
impact that region and are able to apply this knowledge when reviewing
the permit applications. 199 Furthermore, the state-level environmental
board's policy decisions are presumed by the Vermont courts to further
the purpose of the statute. 200 Based on the aforementioned reasons, the
Eighth Circuit's concerns about the effectiveness of right-to-farm statutes
(and their burden on agri-businesses) could be addressed through
implementation of a similar regulatory system in the Midwest. Despite
incidental impacts on interstate commerce (if any), a long-term growth
solution modeled after Act 250 would likely not only benefit the people
of the Midwest, but would be an effective alternative to the problems
raised earlier in this Article.
In general, any growth management statute passing dormant
Commerce Clause muster is less occupied with explicitly regulating
market competition for the sake of providing its vendors a competitive
edge and more concerned with managing state resources in a manner
that encourages environmental and economic sustainability. Thus, it
would be difficult "to imagine a situation in which a growthmanagement statute, without being discriminatory, would be so
ineffective at accomplishing its purpose and so burdensome to interstate

198. Id.
199. There are nine district environmental commissions throughout the state, and these
districts "roughly correspond to the various topographic features of the state." Dreiseward,
supra note 98, at 332 n.45. Each district commission consists of three citizens, appointed by
the governor, and the structure of these "decentralized commissions reflect[s] Vermont's
tradition of the town meeting form of government." Id. (citing BROOKS ET AL., COMMUNITY
SUSTAINABILTY, supranote 98, ch. 2, at 1, ch. 5, at 4).
200. Thomas R. McKeon, Comment, State Regulation of Subdivisions: Defining the
Boundary Between State and Local Land Use Jurisdiction in Vermont, Maine and Florida,19 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 385, 394 (1991) ("In reality, although the court has overturned Board
decisions, it typically grants the Board a great deal of deference, giving the Board's
interpretation of its enacting statutes a presumption of validity."). See also In re Wal-mart
Stores, Inc., 702 A.2d 397, 400 (Vt. 1997) ("We give deference to the Environmental Board's
interpretation of Act 250 and its own rules, and to the Board's specialized knowledge in the
environmental field."); In re Spring Brook Farm Found., Inc., 671 A.2d 315, 317 (Vt. 1995)
("Indeed, the Board's application of Act 250 to a specific project is entitled to a presumption
of validity.").
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commerce that it would be invalidated by a court under the balancing
20
test of Pike." '
Regional planning accurately addresses the "economic and
environmental health of a region, while also providing for the needs of
individual localities." 2 2 Further, policies like Act 250 are attempts to
address the impacts of significant development activity on the state's
natural resources and economic sustainability. Given the long-term
recognition of these legitimate state interests and the right of states to
enact legislation to protect these interests, any constitutional challenge to
a similar growth management statute would "have to take into
account.. .a state's.. .very legitimate, and very weighty, interest in
ensuring that its lands are used in a manner that is beneficial, in tangible
20 3
and intangible ways, to the people of the state."
CONCLUSION
Recently, farming operations in the Midwest have been doubling
in size "with a regularity that rivals the seasons." 204 While Americans
normally embrace a bigger is better attitude, to do so in the Heartland's
case could lead to its demise. This is in part because larger more
intensive farming operations are associated with an increase in the
degradation of the state's natural resources. Unregulated environmental
degradation, in turn, creates problems for a state striving to preserve an
economy based in part on utilization of its natural resources. Without a
viable economy, a host of additional social problems arise. While states
have a recognized legal right to adequately address diminished
environmental and social conditions in rural and farming communities
by preserving valuable and unique natural resources via a regulatory
scheme, they must provide sufficient empirical evidence of a correlation
between the problem and the regulated source to satisfy constitutional
review. Previous solutions, such as South Dakota's Amendment E, have
failed to focus on the real source of these problems- aggregation,
regardless of ownership-and have been struck down as unworkable,
ineffective, and unconstitutional.
If a state like South Dakota could provide sufficient empirical
evidence of a correlation between environmental degradation and
aggregation, one potential antidote to the problems would be to enact a
land use regulatory scheme that utilizes a comprehensive management
201.
202.
203.
204.

Shoemake, supra note 95. at 930.
Salkin, supra note 97, at 55.
Shoernake, supra note 95, at 930.
Dooling, supra note 8, at 13.

830

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 46

plan for the unified use of the state's resources. Such a solution could
help delay or prevent unwanted changes in the community and, if
modeled in fact as well as in spirit after Vermont's Act 250, would
provide the desired protection against the myriad problems associated
with aggregation in a manner that is consistent with the requirements of
the dormant Commerce Clause.

